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Introduction
Intra-household allocation of resources can be defined in different ways and it is crucial for
setting correctly welfare policies; for instance, the comparison between different policies
against children poverty, or for supporting fertility and female labor supply, is possible if
the intra-household allocation of resources is known, both in terms of time use and flows
of income. Traditionally, economic theory has considered the family as the basic decision
unit and the tools of consumer theory were applied to the household; accordingly house-
hold’s choices, both on consumption and on labor supply, were analyzed as those of one
person by applying the single rational agent hypothesis. Despite the general practice, this
approach has weakness as not only in terms of its theoretical foundations1, but also in
terms of empirical support2. A viable alternative to the unitary framework must recognize
in a nontrivial fashion the involvement of two or more agents, with distinct preferences, in
shaping family preferences. In the collective approach, firstly suggested by Bourguignon
(1984) and Chiappori (1988b, 1992)3, household’s choices are grounded in individual pref-
erences of each member, more frequently the adults; therefore family’s choices are regarded
as the result of a decision process. The main assumption of this approach is that house-
hold decisions are always efficient in the Pareto sense: nothing is said a priori about the
nature of the decision process and the so called sharing rule, i.e. the rule governing intra-
household allocation, has to be estimated from the data rather than postulated ex ante4.
The present literature on collective models identify the derivatives of the sharing rule and
empirically recover it, up to a constant5. In a very recent paper, Kalugina et al. (2009)
1The unitary model is not coherent with individualism, one of the most important assumption of the
neo-classical micro-economic analysis, which requires each individual to be characterized by her/his own
preferences.
2One of the consequences of the unitary model is the pooling of all household resources and cross
substitution effects on labor, or -more generally- symmetry of the Slusky matrix. A large number of
empirical studies find that the fraction of earned income received by the husband and wife significantly
affects the family behavior (see among others Bourguignon et al. (1993)).
3A complete survey of this approach is in Chiappori and Donni (2006)
4In comparison with bargaining models, the collective approach is more general in the sense that
cooperative bargaining Nash solutions, at least under symmetric information, are always Pareto efficient.
The collective approach seems to be more reasonable concerning the assumption on the nature of the
decision process which may be assumed to be both cooperative and non cooperative. In particular, how
Browning et al. (1994) motivate their assumption of Pareto optimality is quite strong. They argue that the
marital environment possesses characteristics, such as a long term relationship, relatively good information
and a stable bargaining environment, which would promote efficient outcomes not only in a cooperative
game but also in a repeated non-cooperative game.
5In the original model proposed by Chiappori (1988a,b) and Chiappori et al. (2002) two individuals
are assumed (each of them privately consumes leisure and a Hicksian composite good) and the main
conclusion is that the two individual preferences, and the decision process, can generically be recovered
(up to an additive constant) from the two labor supply functions. This result has been extended to
household production by Chiappori (1997); Bourguignon and Chiuri (2005) and in Blundell et al. (2007)
to discrete participation decisions. The model has been empirically applied by (among others) Fortin and
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go beyond by using self reported data. More precisely, they assume a link between the
distribution of the total resources of the household and the self reported household income
level declared by the two adult members. Their conjecture is that there is a connection
between the personal perception of total resources of the family and the share individually
managed by each member.
This paper provides an application of a collective model with data on Italian households
by using self reported information on whole satisfaction in life. The model is a collective
model with household production and subjective questions are interpreted in relation with
the sharing rule governing the bargaining process in the household. In particular, the
answer to the question: ‘By bearing in mind your last 12 months, are you in the whole
satisfied or not satisfied of your present life?’ is interpreted to recover the sharing process
of the household full income. We use subjective data on whole satisfaction because the
theoretical model with household production implies a wide concept of full income, which
includes the allocation of time between the spouses both in the market and domestic work
and for leisure. Ladder questions on subjective data are reported on the 2003 ISTAT Time
Use Survey (TUS), which is a survey lacking in information concerning individual wages
and on non labor incomes. To test the use of self reported data, the collective rationality, as
well as the sharing rule, incomes data are essential and provided in this paper by matching
the TUS with the 2003 Bank of Italy Survey on Households Income and Wealth (SHIW).
With those data we demonstrate not only that self reported data on satisfaction are useful
in recovering the individual share of the household full income and the relevance of wages
in the bargaining process, but also that non strictly economic individual variables, such
as the spouses’ level of education and the age, and some household characteristics, as for
example the age of the children and the presence of other members in the family, are of
course important in explaining the Italian sharing rule.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 1 presents the theoretical framework and the
econometric specification. Section 2 describes the two data sets employed to estimate the
model with Italian data and the matching procedure required. Section 3 discusses the use
of subjective data in collective models. Section 4 presents the results of the estimation of
the intra household index, the female and male domestic labor supply and of the sharing
rule. Section 6 concludes.
Lacroix (1997); Chiappori et al. (2002), and very recently by Rapoport et al. (2009). In all these works the
estimation of the sharing rule is limited to the first derivatives (for instance in Rapoport et al. (2009) and
Bourguignon and Chiuri (2005)), or the sharing rule has been recovered by assuming that if the female
and the male wages are equal, the sharing rule should be one half of the full income.
3
1 The model
In the collective model adopted here household resources are labor income, non labor
income and the output of the household production. Following the usual notation, let
consider the two adult members of the household i = f,m, each of them with her/his
individual utility function. Individual utility function depends on Li -the leisure (assignable
and observed)-, on consumption Ci of a Hicksian composite good with a normalized price
equal to 1 (unobservable) and on a vector Yi of member i’s consumption of a domestic
goods. Briefly, the individual utility function is the following: Ui = Ui (Li, Ci, Yi, z),
where z is an N - vector of household characteristics. Let the production function of the
kth domestic good be:
Y k = gk
(
tkf , t
k
m, z
)
k = 1, ......K
where tki , i = m, f is the member i’s household work devoted to the production of the
domestic good k. Let T be the total time available and ti =
∑
tki i = m, f the total
time that household members devote to the production of the domestic goods. Let s be
an R-vector of distribution factors, y the household’s non labor income andwf and wm
the female and male wage rates, respectively. The Pareto efficient solution of a collective
model with household production is the result of a following maximization program (1)
Max
L,fCf ,Yf ,Lm,Cm,Ym
(µf (.) + Uf (Lf , Cf , Yf , ...., z) + µm (.)Um (Lm, Cm, Ym, ....., z))
s.t. Cf + Cm + pYf+pYm + Lfwf + Lmwm ≤ Twf + Twm + y + Π (wf , wm, p)
(1)
where µi = µi (wf , wm, y, s, z) are in [0, 1] continuously differentiable weighting factors
such that µf + µm = 1 ; Π (wf , wm, p) is the profit function of the household production;
domestic goods are marketable and p is a vector of domestic goods prices, exogenous and
equal for all households.
Maximization program (1) can be reformulated in programs (2) and (3) as follow:
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Max
tf,tm
Π = pY − wf tf − wmtm (2)
Max
Ci,Li,Yi
Ui = (Li, Ci, Yi, ......, z) i = f,m (3)
s.t.
Ci + pYi + Liwi ≤ φi
Li + hi + ti = T
Where there are two constraints, on budget and on time, and φi (wf , wm, p, y; s, z) is the
part of the full income allocated to the member i, such that: φ = φf +φm = (wf + wm)T+
y + Π.
In other words, here full income φ is a sum of monetary and non monetary incomes: the
total time available –at the price of individual wage- plus the non labor income plus the
profit of the household production function. Programs (2) and (3) can be reformulated as
follow to recover the Marshallian demands for leisure:
Max
tf ,tm
Π = pY − wf tf − wmtm
Max
Ci,Li,Yi
Ui (Li, Ci, Yi, ......, z) , i = f,m
s.t.
Cf + pYf + wf (T − hf ) ≤ φf
Cm + pYm + wm (T − hm) ≤ φm
where hi is member’s i working time on the market,
φm + φf = φ
Li + hi + ti = T
Lf = Lf (wf , φf (wf , wm, y, s, z) ; z)
Lm = Lm (wm, φ− φf (wm, wf , y, s, z) ; z)
where Lf and Lm are the Marshallian demands for leisure.
As illustrated in deep in Section 3, the assumption made in this paper in that the subjective
answer on satisfaction of each member of the couple is related with the share of full income
each of them receives. That it means that if both, husband and wife, give the same
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reply to this question we assume that the bargaining process in the household is such
that φf = φm , while if she declares a better (worse) satisfaction in comparison with her
husband evaluation, we assume that φf > φm( φf < φm).
Considering the definition of full income, these conjecture imply that:
φf <
1
2
[(wf + wm)T + y + Π] if φf < φm
φf =
1
2
[(wf + wm)T + y + Π] if φf = φm
φf >
1
2
[(wf + wm)T + y + Π] if φf > φm
To test this model and recovering the sharing rule, we proceed in three main steps:
(1) first of all, we test the assumption that the subjective answers are related with household
full income, with a simultaneous estimation of them with respect to individual and family
explanatory variables;
(2) secondly, we estimate a three equations model, i.e. the two domestic labor supplies
and the index of inequality in the family, hereafter described. The estimation is a FIML
and this step is necessary to test the collective rationality and the inequality index created
from self reported data;
(3) finally, the parameters of the sharing rule for the sub sample of couple who declare the
same level of satisfaction are estimated. For this sub sample, in fact, the sharing rule is
identified and so the sub sample parameters can be used to estimated the whole sample
sharing rule.
The econometric model is built considering that in program (2) the allocation of time is
endogenous, as the profit of the household production function. While time devoted to
domestic work, time for leisure and time in labor market are observables, the profit of the
production function and the sharing rules are not known and should be recovered from the
data. The profit of the production function is the only variable that is endogenous and
which is common to the three equations of the system: actually the two domestic labor
supplies depend on φ, which depend on Π. Following closely Kalugina et al. (2009), let
define an index function I, which is increasing depending on the female share of full income,
i.e. it is equal to zero if φf < φm , I=1 if φf = φm and assumes value 2 if φf > φm. The
unobservable sharing rule is a function of individual and family characteristics, as follows:
φ∗f = γ
′Z + ε
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The index function can be written as:
I =

0, if φ∗f ≤ k1
1, if k1 < φ∗f ≤ k2
2, if φ∗f > k
and the following is the system to estimate:

0, if φ∗f ≤ k1
1, if k1 < φ∗f ≤ k2
2, if φ∗f > k2
tf = αfXf + u1
tm = αmXm + u2
Wilkelmann (2005) shows that to identify the intra-family correlation in well-being in a
couple by using self reported data, an ordered probit model is required. Since in this
system there is an ordered component, the index, and a linear one, i.e. the two domestic
labor supply equations, we use a full information maximum likelihood estimation6. As far
as the sharing rule is concerned, programs (2) and (3) allows to recover not only the two
household members Marshallian demand for leisure, but also the two total labor supplies
(of market and non market labor), that are estimated with the following specification:
Hf = αf + βf lnφf + γfXf + ef (4)
Hm = αm + βm lnφm + γmXm + em (5)
where (αf , αm, βf , βm, γf , γf ) , are the parameters’ vectors of individual characteristics
and ef and em the errors terms. Programs (2) and (3) allow us to recover the derivatives
of the sharing rule7, but not the sharing rule itself. As known, to evaluate empirically the
sharing rule an additional assumption is necessary and, in line with Kalugina et al. (2009),
here is that in the sub-sample of couples who declare the same level of whole satisfaction
in life, the partners share the same amount of the total full income in the following way:
φf = φm =
1
2
[(wf + wm)]T + y + Π
6We drop from the sample households with I=1 as the results of extreme values of satisfaction (1 and 4).
This is to avoid equal responses at the boundaries, that may not indicate actual convergence of responses
since in these points people could not choose higher or lower values.
7Chiappori (1997) and Chiappori et al. (2002)
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Assuming that Π is very small, φf and φm are known and the two total labor supplies
equations (4) and (5) can be estimated. We correct for sample selection in the estimation
of the two labour supplies in the sub-sample of couples for whom the index value is 1. The
method of estimation in this case is 3SLS and sample selection bias is corrected using the
inverse of the Mill’s ratio resulting from the ordered probit. Finally, the parameters of
two labour supply equations can be used to estimated the sharing rule with the following
specification:
ln Rˆ = δX + u
where X = (wf , wm, yf , ym, s, z) and lnRˆ is the predicted natural logarithm of the ra-
tio between the man’s and woman’s shares. The method applied in this final stage is
weighted least squares. Following again Kalugina et al. (2009), we construct weights to
ponder stronger observations whose predicted sharing ratios are more in coherence with the
equality index evolution and weaker than those with less coherent predictions. The weight
assigned to an observation is defined as the inverse of the variance of this observation.
2 The data
The data we dispose of come from two different surveys. The main survey is the Italian
Time Use Survey (TUS) collected by the Italian National Statistics Institute (ISTAT)
during 2002 and 2003. The TUS is a nationally representative survey covered 21,075
households and 55,773 individuals. For the scope of the analysis we select a sub-sample of
4,673 dual-earner couples. The survey contains information on individual time use, level
of education, working status, professional position and subjective well being. As far as
time use is concerned, information is collected from three sources: the first one is a general
questionnaire; the second is a questionnaire on the weekly use of time, while the third source
is a diary of a whole day. In the weekly questionnaire, time use is recorded hourly during
seven days, normally those of the previous week of the interview. In the diary questionnaire
information is reported every ten minutes, along a day chosen by the respondent. Thus from
TUS we are able to recover individual variables on working status, domestic and market
labor supply and education. We use also a set of household variables giving information
on family’s composition, residential location and the relationship between the individual
characteristics of the two spouses.
Unfortunately the TUS does not allow one to identify individual wages or income from
other sources. Hence we have to recover income’s variables from the Survey on Income and
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Wealth (SHIW) collected by the Bank of Italy in the same year, by applying a statistical
matching method. The 2002 SHIW covered 8,011 households and 22,148 individuals from
which we select again 1,453 dual earner couples for whom the two salaries are observed.
The survey contains information on working hours and income by each member of the
household and on the wealth of the household. The SHIW is a two-years survey, and so
more recent data are disposable. On the contrary for TUS, the 2002 is the most recent
available.
Table 1: Statistics of the imputed variables from SHIW (2002) sample to TUS (2002)
sample
(1) (2)
Mean Standard Deviation
Female hourly wage in the SHIW sample 9.409 11.261
Female hourly wage in the TUS sample after matching 9.569 9.912
Female hourly wage in the SHIW sample 12.062 15.496
Female hourly wage in the TUS sample after matching 11.530 15.212
Annual non labour income in the SHIW sample 1188.781 3943.325
Annual non labour income in the TUS sample after matching 1056.336 3230.34
The two surveys are complementary in that they both contain detailed demographic char-
acteristics, education, skills. The statistical matching would be feasible since the data
sets share a common set of conditioning variables and are drawn from the same popula-
tion8. The first condition is satisfied after re-coding variables on education and profes-
sional position to make definitions comparable across the two surveys. The two samples
are homogeneous due to the selection in both surveys of sub-samples with the same similar
characteristics Additional possible source of bias in using complementary sources is the dif-
ference in the surveys sampling design. Battistin et al. (2003) proposed a procedure based
on propensity score estimation in order to correct for sampling difference, they applied
this procedure to Italian ISTAT’s and Bank of Italy’s data sets and their results show that
correcting for sampling may not be required. According to their results we can reasonably
assume that bias coming from sampling is negligible in our data.
We have to recover two variables (wage rates and non labor income in 2002 SHIW) into 2002
TUS where they are unobserved. Since we deal with a multivariate imputation we follow
the approach of Multiple Chained Equations (MICE) proposed by Van Buuren et al. (1999)
and implemented in Stata by Royston (2004). The required assumption to implement this
procedure is that missing data are at random (Van Buuren et al., 1999), which is feasible
when the missing values distribution depends only on the statistical source and not on
8Previous studies based on the use of complementary sources point out the requirement of these two
fundamental conditions in order to implement a robust matching (Arellano and Meghir, 1992; Battistin
et al., 2003)
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selection bias9.
We specify two conditional distributions for the variables to be imputed using the following
set of variables: age, number of children, education, gender, region, family composition,
professional position and a subjective evaluation on economic situation of the family. This
methodology imputes the variables using a switching regression procedure as described in
Van Buuren et al. (1999, p. 690)10.
Statistics on observed and imputed variables are shown in Table 1: means and standard
deviations from the two samples are not statistically significant after imputation. Matching
results are even more appropriate for wage rates which recover fundamental information
for the scope of the analysis. The imputed variables respect the observed distribution also
across Italian regions11
3 Self reported data
The main justification of using subjective data in economics points to the limitation of the
axiomatic theory of revealed preferences (Senik, 2005). More precisely, the use of subjective
data was launched by the Leyden School in the seventies and has developed during all the
nineties in fields such as the measurement of poverty and the perception of inequality (see
Thurow (1971) and Ravallion and Lokshin (2001)) , in which the interpersonal comparisons
of utility is essential12. Generally speaking, the axiomatic theory of revealed preferences
is useless when market failures, non market interaction and coordination failures has to
be taken into account. But inequality, poverty and redistributive issues are not the only
fields in which satisfaction can be usefully employed: for example the measurement of
unemployment costs has been largely analyzed in this perspective (Clark and Oswald,
1994; Winkelmann and Winkelmann, 1998).
In this paper we use subjective data to better understand the interaction between the
two adult members of the household, bearing in mind that both market and non market
factors characterize this interaction. From a methodological point of view, interpreting
subjective satisfaction data implies (i) relating discrete verbal satisfaction judgments to a
9The imputation of the values on TUS sample is done using the distributions observed for the inter-
esting variables in the SHIW sample. Thus the probability of missingness does not depend on unobserved
information but only on the data source. As consequence we can reasonably assume that our missing are
“at random”.
10We use the Stata module ice (Royston, 2005) with the “match” option which replaces the linear
regression imputation with a matching procedure. Matching is recommended instead of linear regressions
for continuous variables when the normality assumption is untenable, as in this case. Hence this method
is robust to departures from normality in the imputed variables distribution.
11Further data on the variables distribution are available upon request.
12Van Praag and Frijters (1999)
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Table 2: Description of main variables
(1) (2)
Mean Standard Deviation
Index of economic equality 0.991 (0.528)
Male reply to the satisfaction’s question 2.912 (0.542)
Female reply to the satisfaction’s question 2.903 (0.546)
Monthly household’s non labour income 378.164 (700.439)
Monthly wage of male partner 1,506.243 (4,176.652)
Monthly wage of the female partner 840.485 (2,237.963)
Female’s hourly wage (euros) 10.495 (20.749)
Male’s hourly wage (euros) 12.270 (21.977)
Total labour supply (market and domestic) of female partner 234.602 (105.209)
Total labour supply (market and domestic) of male partner 182.422 (119.681)
Female monthly domestic work hours 149.658 (86.021)
Male monthly domestic work hours 55.168 (61.612)
Level of education of female partner 4.583 (1.458)
Male partner’s level of education 4.745 (1.492)
Male partner age 43.829 (9.011)
Female partner age 40.692 (8.620)
Number of children under 3 years old 0.148 (0.379)
Number of children under 6 years old 0.205 (0.448)
Number of children over 6 years old 0.591 (0.769)
People living in the household not belonging to the family 0.016 (0.127)
Household size 3.386 (0.926)
Family has a domestic worker 0.051 (0.219)
Family has a babysitter 0.025 (0.156)
Dummy for The Islands 0.065 (0.247)
Dummy for South 0.191 (0.393)
Dummy for Centre 0.190 (0.392)
Dummy for North East 0.226 (0.419)
Observations 4673
latent, unobserved, continuous utility variable, and (ii) associating utility levels to observ-
able characteristics. Considering each stage of this process, strong assumptions must be
accepted: (a) the link between observable variables (income for instance) and latent utility
is the same for all individuals, i.e. the parameters of the individual satisfaction function
are identical for all agents; (b) the association between a verbal satisfaction label and a
latent utility level is the same for everybody13. The Leyden school explicitly adopts both
assumptions on the ground that “facing a given satisfaction scale, individuals, in order to
make their answers as significant as possible, divide the maximum imaginable amount of
utility in as many equal shares as proposed intervals” , and “individuals of a same culture
associate the same utility quantiles to the same satisfaction labels ”14.
In this work verbal satisfaction judgment are taken from the TUS, which includes a large
set of subjective questions on health condition, job satisfaction and disposable leisure,
13Senik (2005)
14Van Praag (1991)
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on household economic level and on spouses’ sharing either in domestic work andin car-
ing duties. As anticipated in Section 1, here the sharing rule is recovered starting from
the spouse’s answer to a question, formulated as follows: “By bearing in mind the last
12 months, are you in the whole satisfied or unsatisfied of your present life? and with
this possible answers : “Fully satisfied”, “Rather satisfied”, “Less than satisfied” and “Not
satisfied at all” and “No answer”.
To recover the sharing rule by using this information, the assumptions required are not
only those related with satisfaction data, but also those needed to understand the couple
interaction. As regards the first point, in line with the Leyden school, we assume that
the link between observable variables (full income) and latent utility is the same for the
partners, in other words the parameters of the individual satisfaction function are identical
for the two agents and the association between the verbal satisfaction label and a latent
utility level is the same.
As far as the couple interaction, the conjectures done in this paper are two: first, that
the discrete verbal satisfaction judgment given by each spouse is a good approximation of
the utility that each one obtains from her/his share of full income. As precised in section
1, the maximization program of the household can be considered as a two steps program
in which in the first stage the household production function is maximized and in the
second stage individual utility is considered. In this theoretical framework full income is
defined as the sum of different factors: labor and non labor incomes and the profit of
the household production function. In particular, this measure of full income come from
different combinations of time spends by each member in labor market, domestic work
and leisure. Considering this large definition of full income, the individual judgment of
whole satisfaction in life seems to be more suitable for approximate the combination of all
those issues, rather than the individual self judgment specifically on one of these (i.e. job
satisfaction, amount and quality of leisure or the household economic welfare).
The second assumption is done to recover the sharing rule; as known from section 1, we
assume that if partners give the same answer to the whole satisfaction in life, this means
that in the allocation of the household full income both succeed in drawing the same
amount. As clearly illustrated by Kalugina et al. (2006) the equal satisfaction scales is
here interpreted as the equal utility distribution. Let Vf (wf , φf ) and Vm (wm, φm)be the
indirect utility function and g the utility ratio:
Vf (wf , φf )
Vm (wm, φm)
= g (wf , wm, φf , φm)
if Vf (wf , φf )=Vm (wm, φm), then g = 1. In such a way the sharing rule for the sub-sample
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of spouses who give the same answer to the satisfaction question is fully identified.
4 The results
Table 3 shows the simultaneous estimation of the two partners answers to the satisfaction
question. The main important result is that the difference between the female and the
male hourly wage has a high significance for the male. This means that partner wage is
relevant in the individual judgment of whole satisfaction, even if the negative sign of the
coefficient seems to suggest that for Italian men is relevant to have a higher wage with
respect to the female partner.
Table 3: Simultaneous estimation of two partners replies on general satifaction (3SLS)
(1) (2)
Male’s satisfaction Female’s satisfaction
Natural log of hourly wage of female partner 0.020 0.004
(0.014) (0.014)
Difference between female and male natural log of hourly wage -0.028*** -0.013
(0.011) (0.011)
Natural log of hh non labour income -0.009* -0.014***
(0.005) (0.005)
Female monthly hours of domestic work (log) -0.003 0.001
(0.003) (0.003)
Male monthly hours of domestic work (log) 0.001 0.000
(0.002) (0.002)
Difference of age between the female and the male partner 0.001 0.003
(0.002) (0.002)
Dummy for female higher educated than male -0.019 0.001
(0.020) (0.020)
Household has both a domestic help and baby-sitter 0.079 -0.086
(0.101) (0.102)
Number of children under 3 years old 0.055*** 0.096***
(0.021) (0.021)
Number of children under 6 years old 0.035** -0.006
(0.018) (0.018)
Number of children over 6 years old -0.026** -0.013
(0.011) (0.011)
Constant 2.922*** 2.955***
(0.041) (0.042)
Observations 4673 4673
R-squared 0.007 0.008
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
A possible explanation of this result is that the Italian couple interaction is more affected
by cultural factors than by pure economic variables. In particular, this estimation shows
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that the male partner satisfaction in highly influenced by the female partner wage, but
not if this increases the whole household economic resources; the female partner wage
seems to be more important if it assigns a higher position to the male partner, at least
in the job market. Consider that it is possible to appreciate this point only if data on
whole satisfaction in life are analyzed, while the same simultaneous estimation on the self
judgment on household economic situation shows that both partners answers are positively
correlated with the partner’s wage15. As far as family characteristics is concerned, the
presence of children under three years old is positively correlated with the whole satisfaction
of both partners, while children under six years old are positively correlated with male
satisfaction and negatively with the female satisfaction, even if in a non-significant measure.
The presence of children over six years old appears to be negatively correlated also with
the male satisfaction. A possible explanation of these results, confirmed in the next steps
of this work, could be the difficulty in having suitable caring solutions for Italian female
workers16 and the pressure on economic resources perceived by the male partner when the
age of the children increases. Finally, Table 3 shows a negative and significant coefficient
for household non-labor income, both for the male and the female spouse. The relevance
of non-economic factors in the Italian couple interaction is confirmed by the estimation of
the system of the index I with the two domestic labor supplies.
As expected, Table 4 shows that the female domestic labor supply is negatively related
with her own wage, positively with her age and negatively with the age of the children.
Reasonably, the female domestic labor decreases if there is a domestic worker in the house-
hold and increases for women living in the South of Italy. Accordingly, the male domestic
labor supply in the South of Italy is lower than in the North. Concerning the age of chil-
dren, the maximum of male effort appears to be concentrated with children less than 6
years old, while the caring of children under 3 years old seems to be mainly in charge of
the female partner. Moreover, if the male wage is not relevant in explaining male domestic
labor supply, this is negatively related with the female wage. Finally, the male level of ed-
ucation explains positively his engagement in domestic tasks. The weight of non monetary
variables for individual satisfaction of people living in couple is further straightened by
the index estimation: in explaining answers on better female satisfaction with respect to
their male partners, only the hours of female leisure and the female level of education has
a significance. In the final step of this work we identify the sharing rule by using for the
whole sample the coefficients of the seemingly unrelated estimation of the woman’s and
man’s total labor supply (domestic plus market labor) done for the sub sample of couple
who declare the same level of satisfaction.
15Further data on self judgment on household economic welfare and the related estimation are available
upon request.
16see Del Boca (2002) and Del Boca and Vuri (2007)
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Table 5: Seemigly unrelated regressions: woman’s and man’s total labour supply estimation
(1) (2)
Woman’s total labour supply Man’s total labour supply
Natural logarithm of individual income share 0.233*** 0.996***
(0.009) (0.012)
Natural logarithm of hourly female partner wage -0.020*
(0.011)
Female partner age -0.001
(0.007)
Squared female partner age 0.000
(0.000)
Dummy variable for female high education level -0.149***
(0.017)
Number of children under 3 years old 0.150*** 0.030
(0.023) (0.026)
Number of children under 6 years old 0.095*** 0.048**
(0.019) (0.021)
Number of children over 6 years old 0.063*** 0.038***
(0.012) (0.013)
People living in the household not belonging to the family 0.153** 0.119
(0.067) (0.075)
Family has a babysitter -0.001 0.026
(0.053) (0.060)
Family has a domestic worker -0.121*** -0.033
(0.039) (0.043)
Dummy for The Islands 0.161*** 0.238***
(0.035) (0.039)
Dummy for South 0.204*** 0.216***
(0.027) (0.030)
Dummy for Centre 0.119*** 0.149***
(0.023) (0.026)
Dummy for North East -0.001 0.060**
(0.022) (0.025)
Ratio1 -32.015 -35.813
(51.569) (57.942)
Natural logarithm of hourly male wage -0.715***
(0.015)
Male partner age -0.019**
(0.008)
Squared male partner age 0.000*
(0.000)
Dummy variable for male high education level -0.127***
(0.019)
Constant 19.495 17.836
(25.366) (28.502)
Observations 3076 3076
R-squared 0.233 0.705
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The reference category for the geographical dummies is North West
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Table 5 shows the estimation for the sub-sample and Table 6 displays the estimation of the
sharing rule for the whole sample. Even if dual-earner couples are selected, the seemingly
unrelated regression, from one side, seems to be driven by the variables explaining the
domestic labor supply: as far as the female total monthly hours of work, this is negatively
related with her own age, while very young children require a special effort in terms of
hours worked. On the other side, in the case of the male estimation, the negative and
high significant coefficient of the wage can be justified not only with the domestic labor
supply (which is in average less than one third of the male total work), but also with the
prevalence of an income effect for people less paid.
To conclude, the weighted OLS estimation of the sharing rule points out that the variables
positively related with a bigger female share of full income are, of course, her hourly wage,
but also the level of education of her partner, the presence of a domestic worker and/or
a baby sitter and to live in the North of Italy. Non labor income of the household is not
significant, while the presence of children is negatively related with her bargaining power.
The explanation of this empirical evidence is not straightforward: from one side, taking
into account that the sharing rule is recovered from a different self judgment of the spouses
on their life, a possible reason is that the satisfaction of having children for women is
not sufficiently counterbalanced by the female time spent at home for caring tasks when
children are very young. From the other side, where there are children less than three years
old, the time spent at home seems to increase relatively more for men, as their bargaining
power. Probably, other factors influence the female judgment on the satisfaction in life and
- in this theoretical framework- her bargaining power when there are very young children
in the family. Those elements are not evident from this work, but the issue could be the
aim of future research.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper we recover empirically the sharing rule of a collective model with household
production with data on Italian households. Adopting a methodology proposed Kalugina
et al. (2009), the sharing rule is identified from self reported data. Here we use self reported
data on satisfaction on whole life, instead of the self judgment on the household economic
level. This choice is justified both by the wide concept of full income derived from the
collective model with household production adopted here and with the idea to test if the
allocation of time in the couple is driven not only by the market wage, but also by other
elements. In fact, we show that, if the female market wage still important in explaining
the woman bargaining power in the family, her share of full income increases with the male
level of education and decreases if the household lives in the South of Italy. If the previous
17
Table 6: Weighted OLS estimation of the Sharing Rule
Ln of sharing ratio
Natural logaritm of hourly female partner wage 1.255***
(0.162)
Natural logaritm of hourly male wage 0.692***
(0.109)
Natural logaritm hh non labour income -0.072
(0.045)
Female partner age -0.043***
(0.009)
Difference of age between the female and the male partner 0.001
(0.020)
Level of education of female partner -0.007
(0.051)
Male partner’s level of education -0.103**
(0.046)
Number of children under 3 years old -6.013***
(0.501)
Number of children under 6 years old -2.921***
(0.176)
Number of children over 6 years old -3.200***
(0.190)
People living in the household not belonging to the family -0.003
(0.508)
Family has a domestic worker 4.652***
(0.539)
Family has a babysitter 1.010***
(0.228)
Dummy for The Islands -0.065
(0.449)
Dummy for South -3.082***
(0.276)
Dummy for Centre -2.490***
(0.243)
Dummy for North East 0.915***
(0.166)
Constant -47.281***
(0.712)
Observations 4206
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The reference category for the geographical dummies is North West
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non economic variables are expected, more difficult is to explain the role of children in the
sharing rule. In particular, it seams that the female share of full income declines strongly
if there are very young children in the family.
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